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A B S T R A C T
Religious modes of thinking about the world are widespread in Africa, and have a
pervasive inﬂuence on politics in the broadest sense. We have published else-
where a theoretical model as to how the relationship between politics and religion
may be understood, with potential beneﬁts for observers not just of Africa, but
also of other parts of the world where new combinations of religion and politics
are emerging. Application of this theoretical model requires researchers to re-
think some familiar categories of social science.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Nine years ago, this journal published an article (Ellis & ter Haar 1998) in
which we argued that politics in Africa cannot be fully understood without
reference to religious ideas that are widely shared in societies south of the
Sahara. Subsequently, we developed this hypothesis into a book, Worlds of
Power (Ellis & ter Haar 2004), that presents a theoretical model for ana-
lysing the relationship between religion and politics in sub-Saharan Africa,
showing at length how this can aid understanding of a wide range of social
and political phenomena. We embarked on this exercise simply because
we found the existing models for understanding the relationship between
religion and politics to be unsatisfactory. All the models in common aca-
demic use are based on the assumption of a structural distinction between
the visible or material world and the invisible world, whereas such a rigid
distinction does not reﬂect ideas about the nature of reality that are
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prevalent in Africa. The development of a new theoretical model intended
to explain the relationship between religion and politics in Africa reﬂects
more than a striving for scholarly precision. It promises to be of much
wider usefulness at a time when religious movements are occupying public
space in so many ways and in so many places : neo-pentecostal, charis-
matic and Islamist movements, but also neo-traditional movements like
Kenya’s mungiki (Wamue 2001), or diﬃcult-to-categorise phenomena such
as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda (Van Acker 2004).
The purpose of the present article is to revisit our theory regarding
religion and politics, nine years after its ﬁrst formulation, in the light of
various reviews and critiques that it has encountered. Our theory proceeds
from the proposition that the religious ideas held by so many Africans –
hundreds of millions of people – need to be taken seriously, and should be
considered in their own terms in the ﬁrst instance (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004:
esp. 16–21). Yet it is striking how many reviewers and other readers choose
to describe such ideas as manifestations of ‘ superstition’ or ‘ the occult ’.
This is signiﬁcant because, as Harold Turner (1976: 13) noted in regard
to African-initiated churches, ‘our approach to any range of phenomena
is both revealed and inﬂuenced by the names we bestow upon it ’. In
fact, this observation may aptly be applied to religious phenomena in
general. In Africa, the latter are grounded in distinctive modes of acquir-
ing knowledge about the world, characterised by a holistic approach in
which the sacred and the secular can be said to constitute one organic
reality (Ilesanmi 1995: 54). Philosophers routinely make distinctions
between diﬀerent kinds of knowledge. African modes of thought, we
suggest, are neither more nor less than epistemologies that include ways of
acquiring knowledge not normally considered within the scope of social
science. We suggest that such epistemologies have validity, meaning that
not only do all people have a right to think about the world in whatever
way they choose, but that modes of perception unfamiliar to Western
observers may – in theory, at least – be of universal application.
If this is so, it means that African ideas about religion and its relation to
politics are important not only for understanding Africa, but may have the
potential to inform our understanding of religion and politics more gen-
erally, in a world that is presently characterised by new alignments of these
two fundamental elements. This is a capital point, which distinguishes our
approach to the study of religion and politics from the many studies that,
however excellent they may be, are based on the supposition of a separ-
ation of the religious and secular realms. Such studies almost invariably
translate religious data (assumed to be a second order of truth at best)
into sociological terms (assumed to correspond to reality). We argue for a
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diﬀerent point of departure. In order to understand the relation between
religion and politics in Africa, we suggest, it is more fruitful to take
Africans’ own views of reality as a starting point. Generally speaking, these
include both material and immaterial realms.
A N E W T H E O R Y O F R E L I G I O N A N D P O L I T I C S
All the evidence points to the fact that most Africans – like most people on
the planet, for that matter – understand and interpret the world partly
through the prism of religion. In other words, religion, whatever else it
may be, is a mode of apprehending reality. Much, of course, depends
on what is meant by ‘religion’. There is a wide variety of deﬁnitions
in existence. For present purposes, we have argued, the best way to pro-
ceed is not to assume that religion has the same meaning in all times and
places, nor to use whatever deﬁnition the writer personally ﬁnds most
pleasing. A better approach, we suggest, is to study the range of social
phenomena observable in Africa, and only then to formulate a deﬁnition
of religion that incorporates features relevant to its speciﬁc context. This
then constitutes a working deﬁnition – not an attempt to classify religion in
general, but a tool adapted for the purpose at hand (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004:
13–16). A working deﬁnition has the advantage of being provisional in
nature, meaning that it can be adapted in future as new data become
available (Platvoet & Molendijk 1999). Such a deﬁnition will then proceed
from local epistemologies. Among the most salient features of African
epistemologies, we have argued on the basis of empirical research, is
a conviction that the material and immaterial aspects of life cannot be
separated, although they can be distinguished from each other, much as
the two sides of a coin can be discerned but not parted. To judge from
the available evidence, religion in sub-Saharan Africa is best considered
as a belief in the existence of an invisible world, distinct but not separate
from the visible one, that is home to spiritual beings with eﬀective powers
over the material world. This is the deﬁnition that we used in Worlds of
Power.
Another distinctive feature of religion in sub-Saharan Africa is its use of
what may be termed a ‘spirit idiom’. This refers to the widespread belief
that the immaterial forces perceived to be operating in the material world
consist of, or are controlled by, individual spirits. These spirits are often
imagined as having a name and a personality, and to have their abode in
an invisible world. This spirit world is perceived to contain power, and for
those who believe in it, this power is real. Belief in the existence of im-
material forces is common pretty much everywhere in the world, although
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these forces are often imagined in secular terms, for example as social or
economic ones. No serious social scientist thinks that because something
cannot be seen, it therefore does not exist. Furthermore, as we have
argued, a social scientist or other analyst does not have to be a religious
believer in order to study or understand religion. Our own analysis is
not written from the point of view of a religious believer. However, for
many observers, taking African religious ideas seriously requires thinking
about religion in terms diﬀerent from those with which they are most
familiar.
The historical record suggests that what we term ‘religion’ has always
existed in every part of Africa, and that it has been changing continuously.
We do not believe that there exists an authentic Africa that stands outside
time and that incorporates a primal view of the cosmos. Simply, Africa,
like other parts of the world, has a history. It is possible to reconstruct, at
least partially, what people in Africa have thought about the world in the
past and how their ideas have changed over time (cf. Collingwood 1993:
228). Any analysis that places distinct phenomena in historical context
implies a greater or lesser degree of continuity. In the present case, the
historically grounded theory that we propose tends to emphasise con-
tinuities rather than ruptures. Hence, we see current charismatic and
neo-pentecostal or ‘born-again’ Christianity, for example, as a recent
development in a long-existing mode of thinking about the spirit world
rather than as a major historical rupture. This is in spite of the fact
that ‘born-agains ’ often make extravagant rhetorical claims to have made
a complete break with the past (Peel 2006). In other words, the claim
of a born-again Christian to have broken with the past is to be understood
as an emic statement, as distinct from the etic position adopted by an
academic analyst. Thus, the neo-pentecostal movement in Africa reﬂects
the times we live in, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, it can also be
situated in historical context. Religion is a symbolic language, whose
evolution may be compared to that of other languages. Like them, it
reﬂects and communicates people’s ideas about the world they live in. All
languages change over time. Individual items of vocabulary disappear
and new ones appear, invented on the spot or borrowed from abroad.
Languages, however, also have a grammar, a structure that changes only
slowly. Religion, too, has a vocabulary and a grammar, both of which
change over time and at diﬀerent speeds.
Taking religious ideas seriously – the heart of our endeavour – chal-
lenges the academic disciplines in which the study of contemporary Africa
is most often conceived. The basic reason for this is that social science
has been developed over generations on the assumption of a separation
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between the secular and the religious realms. Other writers (e.g. Lal 1998)
have pointed out that this separation reﬂects the historical experience of
Europe, but not necessarily that of the rest of the world. The proper
reaction to this awareness is not to reject social science as irredeemably
Eurocentric, but to adapt its techniques in such a way as to encompass
worldviews that are a product of histories diﬀerent from those of European
countries (Chakrabarty 2000).
With regard to Africa, taking religious ideas seriously seems particularly
to challenge the disciplines of anthropology, development economics and
political science. If we deal with the latter ﬁrst, we may observe that pol-
itical science has no diﬃculty in accepting our proposal to understand
politics as a ﬁeld of activity that is not associated only with state power, but
that can be found in a wide variety of social settings, in the form of politics
‘ from below’. If this is a rather uncontroversial observation, it is no doubt
because it is a theme that has been quite widely studied in the literature on
politics in Africa for over 20 years (Bayart et al. 1992). Far more striking is
the problem caused to political scientists by the subject of religion, which,
at least until the post-9/11 period, they often omitted from their scope
entirely. When political scientists have focussed on religion, with some
notable exceptions, it has tended to be on its institutional aspects rather
than the ideas and social practices that permeate the institutions (e.g.
Haynes 1996). This is rather odd, since there is overwhelming evidence
that institutions borrowed from elsewhere or imposed on a particular so-
ciety by outsiders rapidly gain a distinctive ﬂavour through assimilation
into local repertoires of ideas, to the extent that states are individually
formed through a multiplicity of procedures (Bayart 1991). Development
economists, too, largely ignore religion, although there are signs that a
number of research-funding institutions are beginning to reﬂect on the
importance of religion in African societies, and this may lead to new angles
of vision in due course (Ter Haar & Ellis 2006). Anthropology, on the
other hand, has a long record of considering African religions, but has
tended to do so as cultural artefacts rather than as ‘real ’ religions.
Furthermore, anthropology has often considered African societies in an
ethnographic present rather than in historical terms. Although many an-
thropologists nowadays would claim that these problems have been recti-
ﬁed, and that they do now place the phenomena they analyse in historical
context, such an assertion remains open to question. It has become quite
fashionable for anthropologists to take as objects of study topics related to
religion. Prominent examples include the study of pentecostal movements
and of witchcraft. Both of these are expressions of religious thought and
practice. Pentecostalism is universally acknowledged as a particular form
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of religion, but is often treated by anthropologists with only scant regard
for its global history and theological content. Witchcraft is usually studied
without reference to religion at all – although, being concerned with a
belief in mystical forces, witchcraft falls within the scope of religion (Ter
Haar 2007) according to the deﬁnition we use. Some inﬂuential anthro-
pological studies emphasise the role of these phenomena as modes of
negotiating modernity (e.g. Comaroﬀ & Comaroﬀ 1993; Geschiere
1997 ; Meyer 1999), despite the fact that modernity is not a concept of
great analytical value (Ashforth 2005: 116–21). Moreover, analysing re-
ligious phenomena in terms of negotiating modernity overlooks the fact
that, in Africa, religion has historically been a language for interpreting
the world.
Any project of taking African epistemologies seriously, and attempting
to incorporate them into a formal theory with the power to explain a range
of social and political phenomena, is not an enterprise that concerns Africa
alone. It is for this reason that our book Worlds of Power (2004) is inter-
spersed with comparative material from other parts of the world. Given
the extent and depth of new alignments or realignments of religion and
politics throughout the world, it is possible that a theory developed on the
basis of data from Africa could also provide new insights for analysing
developments in other parts of the world, including notably Asia and the
Middle East. Scholars therefore have a rare opportunity to show that
Africa is not disconnected from world aﬀairs and that the study of Africa
can help in developing a better understanding of these. Religion and
politics are undoubtedly forming new patterns in many parts of the world.
This does not mean, however, that a religious revival is taking place
worldwide, as is often suggested. The new patterns of religion and
politics discernible in Africa and other places are of course aﬀected by
phenomena such as state failure, globalisation and economic crises, as
many commentators have pointed out, but that is not the heart of the
matter. The heart of the matter, rather, is that many people in the world,
just as in sub-Saharan Africa, consider power as having its ultimate
origin in the invisible world. This, we argue, has a marked inﬂuence on
the conduct of politics and on political attributes such as authority and
legitimacy.
Religion remains a prism through which many people view the world.
Worlds of Power investigates this proposition in detail in regard to sub-
Saharan Africa. We show that, for those who believe in it, spiritual power
constitutes real and eﬀective power. Thus, religion and politics become
two facets of power that are in constant interaction. This is not always
evident to observers of African politics, as African countries since colonial
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times have been oﬃcially governed through institutions based on a
Western model of separation of church and state. This institutional
architecture of government has tended to obscure the reality of spiritual
power in Africa’s public life. Like politicians the world over, Africa’s
political leaders spend most of their time in the pursuit or distribution of
material resources, and their cultivation of spiritual power is usually more
private than public. But, in any event, cultivating spiritual power is a vital
component of a political career, as is widely attested by the popular media
and radio trottoir.
This is why no study of African politics can aﬀord to ignore the religious
factor. A prime advantage of adopting our suggested deﬁnition of religion
is that it enables us to consider religion and politics within a single ﬁeld of
power.
S O M E I S S U E S O F M E T H O D
Writing about religion and politics in the way we suggest has certain
methodological implications. Among other things, it entails writing
about religion in Africa in a manner that is objective, in the sense
of not containing hidden assumptions about its ontological and moral
status.
The latter requires particular attention to terminology. We have
already noted (see above) that many reviewers of Worlds of Power assign to
such categories as ‘ superstition’ and ‘magic ’ a range of phenomena that
we prefer to classify as ‘ religious ’. Reference to ‘ superstition’ and ‘magic’
amounts to making unscholarly judgements as to what constitutes proper
or ‘real ’ religion, as opposed to improper types of religion. In similar vein,
many anthropologists writing on Africa today use ‘ the occult ’ as a cat-
egory to include various phenomena that we describe as ‘mystical ’. The
word ‘occult ’, although having a primary meaning of ‘hidden’, has a
pejorative implication when applied to religious matters. All these labels
carry a heavy ideological burden that should be set in historical context :
for centuries, outsiders have tended to judge religious ideas and practices
in Africa as both wrong and morally inferior. The use of such labels as
‘magic’, ‘ superstition’ and ‘ the occult ’ implies that certain phenomena
which in other parts of the world would be classiﬁed as religion, are better
described by diﬀerent terms in the case of Africa. This amounts to a
form of exceptionalism, suggesting that a special vocabulary is needed for
analysing Africa by reason of its supposed uniqueness. It is ironic that
the charge of exceptionalism is sometimes made against our approach
by anthropologists, who, we maintain, continue to struggle with the
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implications of the ethnographic method that has been so foundational in
their discipline (e.g. Green 2006).
To be sure, it is inevitable that social scientists will attribute data to
categories of their own choosing as part of a process of analysis. However,
the choice of categories is neither arbitrary nor innocent. In matters of
religion, we maintain that scholarly analysis is best done in two stages,
known as emic and etic modes of interpretation. This means that the
starting point for analysis is to consider religion in a subject’s own terms of
expression, before analysing it in terms of social science at a later stage.
Following a two-stage process of interpretation of religious data implies a
translation of the symbolic language of religion into the secular language
of social science. In the case of Africa, this process may well involve the
literal translation of key concepts from an African to a European tongue.
In the end, therefore, analysts can never escape the demands imposed by
the language in which they write. Whatever terms they use will always
carry some historical and ideological charge, even such apparently uni-
versal terms as ‘religion’ and ‘politics ’ (Meyer 2004: 466). The knowledge
that this is so does not, however, absolve analysts from their obligation to
take due precautions in making cultural translations of all types (Crick
1976: 109–27), deﬁning, wherever necessary, any category that is being
used for analytical purposes (Platvoet & Molendijk 1999).
African epistemologies often pose a particular challenge to academic
categorisation due to their tendency to work on the basis of addition or
incorporation rather than replacement. In other words, people show a
marked preference for adopting innovations by assimilating new elements
into existing repertoires, without necessarily making a choice between
ideas or practices considered in Western epistemologies to be mutually
contradictory. The tendency in African religious traditions to innovate
through incorporation rather than exclusive selection does not in itself pose
a conceptual problem, but it does require attention from social scientists
used to categorising by reference to distinct typologies. It is relevant to
note that the social science literature on Africa has often been marked by
an insistence on ﬁltering data by reference to dualistic categories of
analysis or binary oppositions, including notably tradition/modernity and
African/non-African, whereas, in African epistemologies, ideas or insti-
tutions can belong to several of these categories simultaneously.
A ﬁnal comment on method is to ascertain whether sub-Saharan Africa
constitutes a viable category for analysis of the matter at hand. Opinion
seems divided on this issue, with some reviewers of Worlds of Power
objecting to the inclusion of material from outside Africa on grounds of
relevance, or arguing that Africa is in any case too diverse to ﬁt a single
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model of analysis. Others, meanwhile, warm to our suggestion that no
aspect of African religion is so unusual that it cannot be understood by
reference to universal categories suitably deﬁned, and that a model of
religious-political interaction developed on the basis of African data can
perhaps be usefully applied to other parts of the world. It is not unusual to
take one sub-continent, one continent, or even the entire world as a unit of
analysis, depending on the matter under consideration. Few people seem
to object to the idea of analysing economics or development in pan-
African terms (as implied, for example, by the existence of NEPAD, the
New Programme for Africa’s Development). The question is whether the
great variety of religious practices and ideas to be found in sub-Saharan
Africa has enough in common as to support this level of generalisation.
In our view, sub-Saharan Africa has at least four common elements that
make it a viable analytical unit for our purpose. These are, ﬁrst, that
religious cultures throughout the region show a marked tendency to posit
the existence of a spirit world. Second, all of sub-Saharan Africa has a
robust oral culture, notwithstanding the use of writing for religious
purposes, in some places for many centuries. Third, African religious cul-
tures have a strong idea of evil as a transcendental force. Fourth, all sub-
Saharan countries have undergone a similar experience of colonialism in
some shape or form, even Ethiopia and Liberia. All four factors have been
signiﬁcant in shaping people’s religious ideas. It should go without saying
that within an area of some 600 million people, there will always be a great
variety of opinions – including, in this case, the existence of professed
atheists – and that any given religious idea is always liable to be associated
with diﬀerent material outcomes, depending on various factors. Taking an
entire sub-continent as a unit of analysis is therefore not unusual, nor does
it amount to ‘cultural essentialism’ (Green 2006), in other words identi-
fying a cultural element that has remained unchanged over time. On the
contrary, the identiﬁcation of common elements over a variety of societies
permits comparison, while insistence on the historical processes that have
aﬀected Africa indicates that religious change has always taken place
there.
In summary, then, we maintain that religion in Africa is grounded in
modes of acquiring knowledge that both reﬂect and shape the ways in
which people have viewed the world, past and present. If only for this
reason, religion has an important bearing on politics, and indeed politics
in Africa cannot be fully understood without taking its religious dimension
into account. Although African epistemologies involve concepts that may
be unfamiliar to many Europeans and North Americans, there is nothing
in them that cannot be analysed by the conventional methods of social
R E L I G I ON AND PO L I T I C S 393
science, provided both the scope of investigation and the terms of analysis
are considered with suﬃcient rigour.
R E L I G I O N A N D D E V E L O P M E N T
Up to this point, we have considered the relation between religion and
politics in Africa as a purely theoretical matter, striving to avoid terms that
imply either approval or disapproval of the data at hand. The question
arises, however, how a theory of religion and politics might be applied to
speciﬁc situations.
Some observers seek to go beyond a consideration of the theoretical
relationship between religion and politics and its close relative, economics.
Interested in practical solutions to real problems, they want to know
whether particular religious trends help or hinder development. For ex-
ample, it is sometimes argued that the emphasis on deliverance found in
neo-pentecostalism diminishes individuals’ sense of personal responsibility
for their own ﬁnancial circumstances, as does the rhetoric of miracles. The
religious views of charismatics – the argument goes – do nothing to en-
courage productivity or a work ethos. The spiritualisation of politics can
thus play into the hands of the worst dictators, who are able to use religion
as a channel of political support (e.g. Giﬀord 1993, 2004). ‘ In what way
have religious revivals aﬀected resources or made life more successful, and
how could one show that? ’, Giﬀord (2005: 247) asks in a review ofWorlds of
Power. ‘Are modiﬁcations of religious ideas in fact leading to Africa’s
economic and political progress? ’
These questions cannot be answered satisfactorily without prior con-
sideration of what the people concerned – in this case, Africans – under-
stand to constitute ‘progress ’ and ‘development ’ (Ter Haar 2006). It is a
mistake to assume, as some authors do, that an improvement of material
and institutional conditions would necessarily reduce ‘ the hegemonies of
the spirit ’ (Green 2006) that are apparent in Africa, and would instead
stimulate the language of liberal secularism. Nor can the symbolic lan-
guage of religion be reduced to a cultural tradition reﬂecting the con-
tinuation of certain ancestral practices. Rather, a religious mode of
apprehending reality (even one couched in a spirit idiom) constitutes an
epistemology that is simultaneously traditional and modern, capable of
updating and renewing itself as times change.
African epistemologies, then, include religious perspectives aﬀecting
popular understandings of concepts such as progress and development,
but also justice, prosperity and others (Ter Haar & Ellis 2006).
Consequently, Africa’s economic and political progress should not be
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considered exclusively in terms of technical criteria such as macro-
economic indicators, nor should all the standard formulae of development
be taken at face value. Nor should the ways in which Africans debate these
matters be assumed to be apolitical because they are expressed in spiritual
idioms. One example is ‘good governance’, an expression widely used in
development circles, but which serves poorly as an analytical concept due
to its implicit value-judgement. The word ‘good’ in this expression invites
judgement in regard to technical excellence, but it also conveys a moral
concept. For many Muslims, for example, good governance implies a so-
ciety that is ultimately ruled in conformity with divine law. Among both
Muslims and non-Muslims in Africa, the moral nature of power depends
on the manner of its exercise, as we have suggested inWorlds of Power (Ellis
& Ter Haar 2004: ch. 7). Charismatic preachers preoccupied with Satan
are not necessarily externalising responsibility for the misfortunes of the
society they live in, but may rather be considered as condemning the
actual presence of evil within their society. Such criticisms are typically
expressed in a spirit idiom and are often extended to national politics, as
we have demonstrated at length in Worlds of Power. The Nigerian scholar
Ogbu Kalu (2006) has pointed out howWestern opinions on these matters
contrast with the analyses of African scholars. These include Matthews
Ojo (2006), Kwabena Asamoah-Gyadu (2005) and Asonzeh Ukah (forth-
coming). This underlines the importance of taking into account studies by
scholars living and working in Africa.
Development, from a religious perspective, is more than a set of tech-
nical benchmarks. For many religious believers, the road to development
is at least as important as the ﬁnal destination. For them, development is
an integral process that implicates the full range of human existence, in-
cluding its perceived spiritual dimension. In such a view, lasting and ef-
fective social change is dependent on the inner change or transformation
of individuals. This is clearly an opinion shared by charismatic Christians
and by Islamists, for example, both of them representing important and
popular movements worldwide, and not just in Africa. As one observer has
noted, many of the major ﬂaws in the development process arise from a
failure to consider the metaphysical questions concerning human life
(Tyndale 2001: 3). In investigating the connection between religion and
development, therefore, the ﬁrst requirement should be to understand
what religious believers are saying and thinking about the nature of society
and its defects, and what ideas they have about its possible improvement.
Academic researchers should scrutinise these issues within the context of
religious actors’ worldviews. Only then is it helpful to investigate the
matter from a social science perspective, and to investigate, for example,
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whether a given religious group has issued a statement on development or
human rights or any associated matter, or has taken money from a corrupt
head of state.
Within the development business, there are signs of a growing accept-
ance of the possibility of diﬀerent paths to political and economic devel-
opment. It has been noted that the success of many East Asian countries
was achieved largely by ignoring the advice of the international ﬁnancial
institutions on speciﬁc economic policies (Stiglitz 2002: 91). More im-
portantly, it was also achieved by some creative marriages between the
technical requirements for development and local political resources that
invariably express themselves in cultural form (Bayart 1994). The realis-
ation that development has an inescapable cultural dimension has, over
time, helped to mellow some of the rigid and even dogmatic theories of
modernisation that were current in the middle of the last century. This is
not to suggest the existence of ﬁxed, development-friendly or develop-
ment-unfriendly cultures, but only to underline that political choices af-
fecting development contain a cultural dimension.
In recent years the relationship between the macro-economic aspects
of development and the social processes involved has been articulated
through the concept of human development, now widely used by
both policy-makers and theorists. According to the United Nations
Development Programme (2006), human development, ‘ is about creating
an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead
productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests ’. It thus
refers to people’s resources beyond any purely material aspect. Many
policy-makers today accept that sustainable development can be achieved
only if people build on their own resources, including the quality of re-
lationships in society, often construed as ‘ social capital ’. In Africa, we have
noted, communication with a perceived spirit world is common religious
practice. In other words, social relationships extend into the invisible
world and the latter hence becomes part of people’s ‘ social capital ’. For
those who believe in its existence, the invisible world is another human
resource. For analytical purposes, religious resources may be divided into
four major categories. Religious ideas (what people believe) are one such
category. Others are religious practices (what people actually do on the
basis of such belief), religious organisation (how religious communities are
formed and function), and religious – or spiritual – experiences (such as
the subjective experience of inner change or transformation) (Ter Haar
2005: 22–7). All of these elements produce knowledge that, in principle,
could be made beneﬁcial to the well-being or the development of a given
community.
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No person or institution has thus far been able to identify mechanisms
for eliminating corruption or injustice, or for improving the quality of
governance in Africa, so eﬀective that they cannot be subverted. Eﬀective
action to improve the quality of governance, and thus of economic per-
formance, can come only from a variety of factors that include a wide-
spread moral commitment to this goal. The latter can take a religious or a
non-religious form: the overwhelming preference of Africans seems to be
to express these matters in a religious idiom. In any event, improvements
of this nature do not come from legislation alone, but from a changed
moral climate (Wraith & Simpkins 1963). This is a point where religion
and development may meet.
S P I R I T U A L K N O W L E D G E A N D H I S T O R Y
Conclusions as to how religion may either help or hinder development can
be situated on a continuum. At one extreme is the proposition that Africa
has to adopt speciﬁed institutional forms if it is to achieve the ‘good
governance’ considered necessary for development. This is a point of view
favoured by aid donors and by the international ﬁnancial institutions,
which generally base their ideas about the types of institutions suitable for
their purpose on models drawn from an idealised reading of European
and North American history. At the other end of the spectrum is an opi-
nion that indigenous institutions and epistemologies can potentially adapt
themselves to a wide variety of purposes, and that development is indeed
most likely where the fundamental technical skills or qualities required
have been incorporated into local social patterns. However, whether in-
digenous or of foreign origin, all institutions depend crucially on the
mental dispositions of those who staﬀ them (Douglas 1986).
It is useful in this regard to consider the widespread sense of power-
lessness that is often said to pervade African populations. Several sources –
from Achille Mbembe (2000: 25–6) to the US National Intelligence
Council (2005) – have noted the importance in Africa of the belief that the
continent is threatened by vast forces that amount to something resem-
bling a cosmic conspiracy. It is undeniable that Africa is indeed threatened
by some massively destructive forces that can be quite precisely identiﬁed,
including disease, debt and underinvestment. At the same time, however,
many Africans also consider these conditions in a spirit idiom, seeing
themselves as beset by evil forces that have a known material cause but
that also have a spiritual dimension (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: ch. 3). The
roots of this conviction that economic and political power has a dangerous
spiritual aspect, which Africans can no longer control, can be located in
R E L I G I ON AND PO L I T I C S 397
the continent’s history. Ultimately, this perceived lack of control dates
from the colonisation and evangelisation of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, that regarded indigenous spiritual forces as harmful, backward
or demonic. A combination of ignorance and prejudice caused European
colonisers and missionaries to despise many indigenous concepts of the
spirit world (Ilesanmi 1995: esp. 54). It is rather disturbing to note that
many secular analysts today appear to react in a comparable way, dis-
playing bias or intolerance regarding manifestations of an interaction be-
tween sacred and secular aspects of reality as it is perceived by many
Africans.
One consequence of this history is that many traditional spiritual ex-
perts have lost prestige and are often regarded as unable to deal with the
evil forces threatening the African continent today. While vast numbers of
people continue to consult local healers, the feeling is widespread that they
cannot provide eﬀective remedies for the key problems of modern times
(Ter Haar 1992: ch. 4 ; Ashforth 2005: esp. 295–300). The quest for ef-
fective healing is evidenced by the enormous variety of priests, clerics,
prophets, diviners or self-proclaimed experts that exists, contributing to
what we term a ‘spiritual confusion’. By this, we mean a situation in which
spiritual forces are considered powerful, but where there is little consensus
on what precisely these forces are, and how they may be channelled or
controlled. This is one main reason why religious or spiritual healing
continues to have such importance in Africa.
As an illustration of what spiritual confusion can lead to, we may take
the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Some reviewers of Worlds of Power won-
dered how a theoretical model of a political world that is deemed insep-
arable from the religious realm might help explain arguably the greatest
tragedy of the late twentieth century. The extensive research carried out
on the Rwandan genocide (Des Forges 1999) has revealed the extent to
which it was planned and implemented with a high degree of bureaucratic
eﬃciency by a political and administrative elite associated with President
Juve´nal Habyarimana and his wife Agathe. However, research making use
of Kinyarwanda-language sources and popular iconography indicates the
overwhelming importance in the genocide of ideas about the nature and
proper use of power that are derived from the sacred kingship of pre-
colonial times (Taylor 2004). In the circumstances of the early 1990s, many
Rwandans were inclined to believe that their country was not able to enjoy
the prosperity and fertility that, according to local religious and political
ideas, emanated from the mystical force of imaana, traditionally channelled
through the government. The work of the ge´nocidaires associated with the
army and the ruling party consisted in persuading many Rwandans to
398 S T E PH EN E L L I S AND GERR I E T ER HAAR
accept that the blockage of the necessary ﬂows of virtue and fertility,
simultaneously political and spiritual, was the fault of political opponents
of the government. The interest of this point is not that it suggests an
alternative explanation for the 1994 genocide. Rather, its importance is
that it adds an extra dimension to explanations that are normally couched
in uniquely secular-political terms. Ordinary Rwandans were moved to
acts of genocide, spurred on by propaganda and fear, because they be-
lieved their society to be threatened not only by political and military
upheaval, but by malevolent spiritual forces also. Only by taking this
spiritual dimension into account does it become easier to understand the
awfulness of genocide: why otherwise ‘good’ people are moved to do
unspeakably evil things ( Juergensmeyer 2003).
: : :
We hope to have demonstrated in this article that the theoretical model
concerning the interaction of religion and politics that we have set out in
our in book Worlds of Power has the power to explain a wide variety of
political phenomena, not only in the conventional sphere of state politics,
but in African societies at large. The main obstacle to the use of this model
as a tool for analysing African politics in the broadest sense appears to be
the novelty of some of its analytical categories, which are drawn from
African epistemologies rather than from mainstream social science. In
our view, this presents no insoluble problems to social scientists – it only
requires them to adopt some new angles of analysis and reﬂection.
Moreover, we maintain that such a theory of religion and politics may well
be useful for analysing societies in other parts of the world in which these
two forms of power are recomposing in ways that do not accord directly
with the classical models of social science. There is an urgent need
for analysts to consider how spiritual power works as a political force in
contemporary societies.
Religion is the emerging political language of our time. Already, in our
original article (Ellis & Ter Haar 1998: 201), we noted that African poli-
ticians were challenged to use this language in a manner comprehensible to
outsiders. We also noted that non-Africans needed to learn this language.
This remains truer than ever : as with any language, learning to under-
stand a spirit idiom takes time and application, but it can be done.
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